

BOISE, MONDAY, JUNE 8, 2026, AT 11:15 A.M.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

LEANNE CHEUNG,)	
)	
Plaintiff-Appellant,)	
)	
v.)	Docket No. 52986
)	
RAYMUNDO G. PENA,)	
)	
Defendant-Respondent.)	
_____)	

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County. Cynthia Yee-Wallace, District Judge.

Brassey Crawford, PLLC, Boise, for Appellant.

Lerma Grover Law, Meridian, for Respondent.

This appeal concerns the renewal of a judgment obtained by Leanne Cheung against her former attorney, Raymundo Pena. The Industrial Commission determined that Mr. Pena wrongfully retained \$166,734.23 in attorney fees for representing Ms. Cheung in a worker’s compensation matter and ordered him to return that sum. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to order the return of approximately \$11,000 of the fees Mr. Pena retained. The Court therefore directed him to disgorge only \$155,641.26.

Shortly after the appeal concluded, the district court entered judgment in Ms. Cheung’s favor in the amount of \$166,734.23. Ms. Cheung renewed the judgment in 2011 under the five-year renewal period then provided by Idaho Code section 10-1111 (2006). Several years later, the Legislature amended section 10-1111 to provide a ten-year renewal period for “judgments issued on and after July 1, 2015.” Act of Mar. 30, 2016, ch. 269, § 2, 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws 724, 724.

When Ms. Cheung sought to renew the judgment again in 2016, the district court, on its own initiative, corrected the judgment amount originally entered in 2006. The court entered an amended judgment in the amount of \$155,641.26 to conform to the remittitur and opinion issued by the Idaho Supreme Court in the earlier appeal. In early 2025, Ms. Cheung sought to renew the judgment for a third time, but the district court denied the motion. The court concluded that the amended judgment entered in 2016 was not a “new” judgment for purposes of section 10-1111 and therefore did not trigger the statute’s ten-year renewal period. The court also declined to treat the 2016 renewal as falling under the amended statute simply because it occurred “on or after July 1, 2015.”

On appeal, Ms. Cheung argues that the district court erred because the 2016 amended judgment made a substantive change to Mr. Pena’s monetary obligation and therefore constitutes a “new” judgment entered after July 1, 2015, subject to the ten-year renewal period. In the

alternative, she contends that the legislature intended the amended version of section 10-1111 to extend the ten-year renewal period not only to judgments initially issued on or after July 1, 2015, but also to judgments renewed on or after that date.